

**Veteran Soldiers:**  
Experiences of Reconciliation and Peace in the Community  
PROPAZ 1995-2001

## **PREFACE**

This document describes the different phases that the PROPAZ programme passed through since the beginning of the organisation in 1995 through to the preparation of the strategic plan in 2001. PROPAZ was created by AMODEG and ADEMIMO, organizations that work with demobilized soldiers from the war that was officially declared over in October 1992. The programme was created with the view that “the complex problems that affect the demobilised soldiers, the understanding and comprehensive approach to the problems, and the attempts to resolve them, require that the demobilised soldiers themselves are transformed into active participants and not merely passive recipients of the post war process of reintegration, pacification and stabilization of the communities and the development of participatory democracy.” Since the creation of PROPAZ the organisation has passed through two important phases. The first programme was the Programme for the Promotion of Peace and Development (PPPD) and the second programme that is underway at present is simply known as the Peace Promotion Programme (PPP). The programme covered the provinces of Nampula, Zambeza and Sofala and in the second phase the programme was extended to include the province of Maputo.

The aim of the organisation PROPAZ is to generate peace initiatives through work with the demobilised soldiers, contribute to the development and consolidation of the peace process and democratisation of Mozambique, encourage the social reintegration of the demobilised soldiers, develop a peace culture through the non violent resolution and transformation of conflicts, and encourage the equal participation of demobilised women in peace initiatives and reintegration at the local level.

In order to achieve these objectives PROPАЗ works with the demobilised soldiers from the two, formerly belligerent, armies in rural and urban communities and is supported by both local and international partners. Since the beginning of the programme, PROPАЗ has supported the peaceful solution of conflicts that threatened peace and social stability in different communities. It was through this work that PROPАЗ became recognised as the main formal institutional reference for the use of demobilised soldiers as peace promoters in conflict resolution not only in Mozambique but also on the African continent and the world in general. The programme has a total of ninety Peace Promoters divided between the provinces of Zambezia (20), Nampula (25), Sofala (20) and Maputo (25), where the headquarters of the organisation is located. The experience of PROPАЗ has been disseminated in Angola, South Africa and the Democratic Republic of Congo, Nicaragua and Northern Ireland. In this document we will describe in detail the working methods, the successes achieved during the last six years and the principle criticisms of the programme.

## I. Introduction

### *1.1. From War to Peace*

Mozambique lived through almost three decades of consecutive wars. First there was the colonial war that started in 1964 and terminated with the Lusaka Agreement in 1974. This Agreement led the way to Mozambican Independence in 1975. One year later violence returned to plague the country through the actions of Ian Smith<sup>1</sup>, which at the same time marked the beginning of the civil war between Renamo and the Government that lasted around sixteen years.

The civil war went through a number of different phases and, by the middle of the 1980s had spread throughout the whole country. Both armies recruited indiscriminately from the rural areas and the cities, from the North to the South of the country, children and youth of both sexes, children of school age and old people of both sexes, were all recruited in order to feed the war effort<sup>2</sup>. It was a period of sixteen years of violent conflict taking the lives of innocent people, traumatising individuals, families and communities, and resulting in the complete destabilisation of all norms and forms of life (Igreja et al., 1999; Schreuder et al., 2001). The violence was accompanied by the destruction of all infrastructures that represented the power of the state throughout the country. Hospitals, schools, shops and collective farms were all destroyed. In 1992, after two years of negotiation, consensus was achieved in Rome. Silence from the sound of arms


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<sup>1</sup> Ian Smith was the Rhodesian Head of State at Mozambican Independence

<sup>2</sup> Victor Igreja, "A Pedagogia dos Recrutamentos nos Longos Anos de Guerra," in NOTÍCIAS, 28/5/97d, p.2.

returned to the country. 92881<sup>3</sup> soldiers from the two armies were demilitarised, demobilised and a programme for social and economic reintegration was carried out with the help of the International Community. The fundamental aspects of the pacification and reintegration process can be seen in Figure 1 below:

Fig. 1.





One of the main goals of the reintegration programmes was to guarantee that peace and social harmony would become a reality, as people feared that if nothing was done quickly for the demobilised soldiers there was a risk of a return to violence. Therefore, from 1994, during the period immediately post-war, the concept of

<sup>3</sup> T. Pardoel, "Demobilization in Mozambique: Socio-economic Profile of the Group of 92881...", 1994.

reintegration of the demobilised soldiers became well known and popular in Mozambique. At different levels of society the issue of creating conditions to facilitate the transition from war to peace was a priority for all concerned. Initiatives were developed to respond to the post-war challenges by the Government, the United Nations and members of civil society, both national and international.

Two fundamental aspects of the reintegration process can be identified through a systematic analysis of the situation, i.e., the context and the nature of the process. The context includes socio-cultural, geo-political, economic and historical variables. The nature of the process can be divided between formal and informal reintegration (Igreja, 1996). The formal reintegration processes defined in the General Peace Accord (AWEPPA, 1992) received financial support and had a limited statute. On the other hand, the informal processes did not receive financial support, and were carried out at community and household level. These initiatives were not time-bound. The process can be represented in the following way:





Within this framework PROPAZ is situated within the formal process, brought about by the bringing together of two formal organisations, i.e., AMODEG and ADEMIMO. This document aims to present the history of PROPAZ, the different phases of development, the different reintegration programmes, the issues involved in the conceptualisation of the ideas and practice in conflict resolution, and the internal conflicts created by the leadership of AMODEG, ADEMIMO and some of the disgruntled association members. This document will also describe, with a self-critical eye, the process of the development and implementation of the strategic plan from 1999 to the present day. Finally, the document will present a summary of the lessons learnt in order to look to the future taking into account the changes that have taken place in the last few years that could give rise to new forms of conflict.

### ***1.2.The Origins of AMODEG and ADEMIMO***

A description of the origins and the subsequent development of PROPAZ must include a description of the process that gave rise to the creation of AMODEG and ADEMIMO, which is where the PROPAZ programme was born, and from where the directors of PROPAZ were drawn. These two organisations, that aim to represent the interests of the demobilised soldiers from the rival armies that emerged from the latest war, were created in 1992 as a result of the consensus in Rome and the signature of the Peace Accord. AMODEG<sup>4</sup>, was established, as expressed in its statutes, to fight for social and economic integration of its members and the **Principle of Reconciliation and National Unity** is the basis of the structure of the organisation. However, it must be made clear that the Government did not develop a National Reconciliation Policy. The Government simply developed a programme for a comprehensive reintegration of the demobilised soldiers from both armies and the creation of a new united army comprised of members of the two armies. The principle of reconciliation in this context should be understood as “ the act of assuming that nothing happened in the past, and at the same time, that this same past should be forgotten”. However, as should be expected it was not possible to pretend that the recent past was not marked by violence and destruction just because the politicians decided that the that the violent memories of the young soldiers that had been used in the service of war, could be expunged in the name of national reconciliation. Implicit in this understanding of reconciliation is also the idea of the "absence of conflicts between veterans and a desire to work together”. To be a soldier in either the Government army or Renamo was sufficient credentials for becoming a member of AMODEG

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<sup>4</sup> Para mais detalhes veja os Estatutos da Associação dos Desmobilizados de Guerra. Uma discussão analítica sobre o funcionamento e estratégias de sobrevivência desta organização pode ser vista em Jessica Schafer 'A baby who does not cry will not be sucked': AMODEG and the Reintegration of Demobilized Soldiers. *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol. 24, No. 1, March 1998.

The same was true for ADEMIMO,<sup>5</sup> with one specific difference, that this organisation represents the interests of the disabled demobilised soldiers.

Initially, the two organisations developed activities separately in the country, always with a view of reaching the demobilised soldiers with the aim of reintegration. After some years of work, AMODEG and ADEMIMO decided to join forces in order to improve efficiency in the defence of the interests of their members, and they created, together, the Peace Promotion and Development Programme, that later became known simply as the Peace Promotion Programme. In the Rome Peace Accord no specific article foresaw the creation of an association for demobilised soldiers. ADEMIMO and AMODEG came about in order that the demobilised soldiers could take a more active part in the reintegration process. These associations also have an historic precedence in Mozambique as after the war of independence an association for War Veterans<sup>6</sup> was formed. However, the most obvious reason for forming AMODEG and ADEMIMO was due to the nature of the reintegration programmes described below.

### ***1.3.Reintegration Programmes for Demobilised Soldiers***

The Economic and Social Reintegration Programmes were defined in the General Peace Accord and were implemented by the Reintegration Commission (CORE).<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> See the Statutes of the Association of the Disabled Demobilised Soldiers and Para-military in Mozambique, November, 1992.

<sup>6</sup> Historically, this is a typical phenomena in post armed conflict situations. The veterans, after the war, need an association where they are represented by people that shared the same, or similar, experiences, and have the same identify. It could also be that associations are formed in order that the soldiers are not quickly forgotten. Unfortunately, due to the general poverty, allied with misunderstandings and the stealing of the few resources the majority of these associations disappear or represent only a minority of the ex-soldiers in the cities.

<sup>7</sup> AWEPA, "General Peace Agreement of Mozambique", 1992, pp. 43-45.

This commission was responsible for implementing of the process of reintegration of demobilised soldiers, with the following specific tasks:

- Planning and organisation;
- Regulation of procedures;
- Direction and supervision;
- Inspection.

Based on economic and social assumptions it was stated that “ reintegration would be achieved when the demobilised soldiers and their families entered or re-entered into civilian life, becoming functional members and accepted by the community, living in the same socio-economic conditions as the general community and without having to turn to violence as a way of maintaining that standard of living.”<sup>8</sup>

The reintegration programmes assumed an implicit link between reintegration and the preservation of peace. Therefore, the process can only be judged by its results, i.e., the demobilised soldiers are well integrated and that social peace is maintained.<sup>9</sup> Social peace will be attained if the following objectives are achieved:

- (1) Eliminate the differences between the demobilised soldiers and the rest of the population;

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<sup>8</sup> IOM, After one year: What is the status of reintegration in Mozambique? 1996, p.1.

<sup>9</sup> Criative Associates International, “Reintegration of Demobilised Soldiers in Mozambique,” 1996, p.5.

(2) Absence of unrest or civil agitation; and

(3) Participation of the demobilised soldiers in community activities.

In order to achieve this the demobilised soldiers and their families were transported to the places of their preference after receiving:

- Material benefits (civilian clothes, food for three months, seeds and kits with agricultural tools);
- Six monthly subsidy paid in two phases: the first phase was paid at the point of demobilisation and the second was paid in the District where the demobilised soldier was located;
- Two monthly subsidies during a 18month period based on the rank of the soldier;
- Technical or professional training in different types of work, including the distribution of Kits with tools for the different trades;
- Distribution of finance for micro-projects;
- Financing of work placements;
- Employment opportunities through the opening of roads.

The bi-monthly payments were terminated in September 1996, a further payment, independent of rank, was made between the 20th of January and the 20th of April

1997 to all demobilised soldiers in order to use the remaining funds from the Reintegration Support Scheme.<sup>10</sup>

### 1.3.1. The lack of success of the reintegration programme

The objective of this programme was to avoid the use of violence by ex-soldiers as a way of resolving their daily problems in the community. This means that one of the main fears that people had was that the ex-soldiers would return to war, this assumption was made under the premise that they had gone to war of their own freewill. This was a false initial premise similar to that made about the return on mass of the Mozambicans in Cuba and ex-East Germany<sup>11</sup>. But in general the objective was achieved with very few reports of national instability perpetrated by this target group. In one or other area of the country there were acts of violence caused by the ex-soldiers but they were always very localised.<sup>12</sup>

The ex-soldiers did not return to war, on the contrary they returned to their communities in order to reconstruct their lives. The reintegration programmes that were launched in parallel to the subsidy did not benefit all demobilised soldiers. This caused frustration, on the one hand, in those soldiers not contemplated in the programme, and on the other hand those who benefited were also frustrated as the courses and the micro-finances that were given did not relate to the reality of the conditions on the ground in the communities that they returned to.

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<sup>10</sup> Sam Barnes, "The Socio-Economic Reintegration of Demobilised Soldiers in Mozambique: The Soldiers' View", 1997, p.2.

<sup>11</sup> With the large-scale return of Mozambicans in the 1980s from East Germany and Cuba the debate centered around the feeling that Mozambique was facing a threat of massive unemployment and a subsequent rise in criminality. It was not discussed how these returning students and workers could contribute to the reconstruction of the country. In the case of the demobilised soldiers it was a case of history repeating itself.

For example, they were given courses as electricians in areas where there was no electricity, they were trained as fishermen where there were no rivers or they were far from the sea, they were trained as businessmen where there was no business to be had; finance was given for market stalls in areas where there was no money in circulation as the majority of the population were living in absolute poverty, and some business men received money to provide employment for this target group, but because there was no control over these employers the wages were not paid, and these schemes were put at risk.

Emphasising the close link between the demobilised soldier and violence or other types of anti-social behaviour, created a stereotype in society where whenever there was any negative event the demobilised soldiers were held responsible. For this reason, when the demobilised soldiers looked for work on their own, they were often rejected because the demobilised soldiers were falsely linked to bad behaviour. Politicians and civil society in general were not adequately prepared to take on the challenge of constructing an effective peace and at the same time work with the soldiers that came out of the war. This situation was made worse by the absence of a National Reconciliation Policy.

#### ***1.4. The Difficulties of Adapting***

A decade after the end of the armed conflict frustration continues to dominate the daily life of the demobilised soldiers who feel that they have been completely forgotten. Each mobilised soldier carries in their memories images that are difficult to erase and they use the past as a way of excusing the degraded life-style that they find themselves swamped in.

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<sup>12</sup> Victor Igreja, “Os Restos da Guerra em Moçambique.” In NOTÍCIAS, 21/02/98, p.2.

This frustration has led to many of the ex-soldiers, without any possible employment perspectives, taking refuge in alcohol and drugs. Which in turn has led to the demobilised soldiers resolving their daily problems in ways that are characterised by a lack of respect for local authorities, the use of physical force and in some cases the use of arms that were hidden during the process of peace negotiations.

Demobilised soldiers, all over the country, do not have sufficient skills to resolve their problems through peaceful and constructive negotiation. The reintegration programmes brought to Mozambique by the “caixeiros viajantes”<sup>13</sup> (travelling boxes) of the United Nations did not contemplate in their recipe the educational, psychological and cultural dimensions of the problem. These three dimensions should have been included in order to take into consideration the specific characteristics of this target group.

The ex-soldiers, for long periods of time, were guided by a behavioural dynamic that was marked by daily violence. At least 27% of the soldiers became part of the armies when they were less than thirteen years of age (Pardoel, p.28). They are children that grew up and became adults guided by references that held death and destruction as the highest values.<sup>14</sup> A critical reflection about peace and the role that demobilised soldiers can play in the consolidation of peace based on the knowledge of the problems raised by this series of issues can be carried out. Within these complex issues one can highlight the following:

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<sup>13</sup> Expression used by Alexandro Bendanã, Director of the International Study Centre in Manágua, referring to the United Nations staff that travel the world offering the same packages for the reintegration programmes post armed conflict even when the socio-economic and political contexts are different. Interview, Maputo, 11/2/98.

<sup>14</sup> Victor Igreja, “Como Reconstruir a Identidade Civil dos Desmobilizados”, in NOTÍCIAS”, 28/04/97c, pp.2-3.

- 1) How to correct the errors committed during the reintegration process?
- 2) What can be done? How can it be done?
- 3) If peace for the national politicians and the international community only means the silencing of arms, how can we widen the scope of this convenient political-social concept and model?
- 4) What initiatives can be taken? Whose responsibility is it to take these initiatives forward?

These and other issues are the starting point for the development of initiatives that use the potential of the demobilised soldiers for the consolidation of peace, reconciliation and national unity.

These questions and critical reflections constituted the basis of an idea that it was urgent to rebuild peace.<sup>15</sup> Not a formal peace that has limitations, but a creative and constructive peace. A peace that is based on the recognition of history and the dynamics of armed conflict, the understanding of local reality, the understanding of local potential and limitations, that can be used for durable and sustainable development. For this reason, we believe that the demobilised soldiers, united in an organised way, can play a fundamental role in the cementing of the desire for the rebuilding of peace in Mozambique. The politicians and the international community failed because they had a limited vision of peace and the implications of peace. The demobilised soldiers, united, knowing intimately the nature and type

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<sup>15</sup> Victor Igreja, “A Reconstrução da Paz: O Caso do Programa PROPAZ”, in DEMOS, 27/5/98, p.4.

of problems inherent in their reintegration and of the communities in which they will be placed, are the ones that can correct the failures.

## **II. The Creation of the Programme for Peace and Development.**

This programme was an initiative by demobilised soldiers and the disabled demobilised soldiers, AMODEG/ADEMIMO, in order to fill in the gaps left by the formal reintegration process that had been introduced into the country by the national political authorities with the support of international donors.

The reintegration process had positive points but also many problematic aspects. The majority of demobilised soldiers had spent long periods on the battlefield and did not have any academic or professional qualifications and few prospects for the future. They were basically non-skilled manual labourers. The culture of peace, tolerance and national reconciliation cannot be obtained only through the payment of money or the carrying out of income generating projects. It is a permanent process of teaching and learning about the culture of dialogue, reconciliation and social justice. This process must include the recognition of errors, passed injustice, the acceptance that we are all Mozambicans and the desire to together rebuild a country independent of political, ethnic or religious affiliations.

AMODEG and ADEMIMO decided to create a programme to promote a culture of peace, tolerance and national reconciliation between the demobilised soldiers and their communities. The main issue that they faced was “know how”. How to develop an initiative led by demobilised soldiers taking into consideration not only the limitations of the group but also of the country itself. There was a lot of

good will and motivation on the part of the ex-soldiers to develop the project, but they did not have the technical assistance or financial resources to give substance to the ideas.

### ***2.1. Local Initiative, External Resources.***

In the absence of internal resources, AMODEG/ADEMIMO had to look outside of Mozambique and include external support provided by experiences at the international level. In 1995, AMODEG, represented by the president of the association, Júlio Nimuíre and the head of the Women's Department, Jacinta Jorge, went to Nicaragua on an exchange visit to discuss the experience of Nicaraguan demobilised soldiers in terms of reconciliation initiatives, culture and education for peace. The visit was financed by TROCAIRE that at the time was headed in Mozambique by Monica O'Brein.

During the visit experiences about the social and economic reintegration of the demobilised soldiers in both countries were discussed. It was seen that even though the situation in each country was different and the experiences were different there were many points of similarity about military and post war life. The demobilised soldiers were facing the same deprivations and difficulties in terms of reintegration. During many years the soldiers were an indispensable part of the armies, and then from one day to the next they were abandoned and thrown out on to the streets of no hope; marginalized.

A protocol for co-operation was signed as a result of this visit between AMODEG and the Foundation for Veterans for Peace, Reconciliation and Development

(FECGPRD). The co-operation agreement had the following objectives.<sup>16</sup>

1. Establish exchange mechanisms for documentation and information about the reintegration processes and peace building in each country and region;
2. Exchange experience about organisational strengthening and capacity building strategies and productive reintegration post war strategies;
3. Organise joint meetings between demobilised soldiers at regional and international level in order to facilitate the exchange of experiences and the building of solidarity between demobilised soldiers;
4. Carry out national and international consultation processes in order to constitute an International Federation of Demobilised Soldiers for Peace;
5. Encourage visits of demobilised soldiers, including representatives of female demobilised soldiers to directly observe peace building and economic reintegration programmes and initiatives carried out by organisations.

This protocol was extremely important for the development of the project in Mozambique. The demobilised Nicaraguan soldiers already had a vast wealth experience in comparison with the Mozambican soldiers in the development of programmes for the management and consolidation of peace. The outcome of the exchange visit was the creation in 1996 of first Programme for Peace and Development in Mozambique.

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<sup>16</sup> Internatioonal Studies Centre , “The Demobilised Soldiers Speak: Reconciliation in Nicarágua, El Salvador and Moçambique”, Managua, 1996, p.26.

## *2.2. The Development of the Programme*

The programme was developed taking into consideration the different socio-cultural, political realities and sensitivities of the country. Three main principles were defined to guide the spirit of the initiative: the principle of **Reconciliation and National Unity, Integration and Gender**. Later, the principles of **Non-exclusion** and **Linguistic Integration** were also included. The last two principles were introduced at later date as a result of problems that were found while putting the programme into practice.<sup>17</sup>

The **Principle of Reconciliation and National Unity** was deemed essential in recognition that the success of the project was dependant on the demobilised soldiers freeing themselves from past loyalties and participating fully in the project. This was the continuation of a process that had begun with AMODEG, namely, that demobilised soldiers from the Government army and the RENAMO army lived together in the same space and worked together for the consolidation of peace, unity and national reconstruction.

The **Principle of Integration** grew out of the premise that the disabled demobilised soldiers should be an important component of the project, not only because they were disabled, but because their contribution would be invaluable in creating a dialogue with other demobilised soldiers in the same situation. ADEMIMO, therefore, was integrated into the co-ordinating group of the project

The **Gender Principle** came about from the premise that women had been important throughout the war, had gained a lot of experience and could contribute significantly to creating a dialogue within this group in the post war period. For

this reason the head of the women department in AMODEG was chosen as part of the co-ordinating group.

After establishing the guiding principles it was necessary to build a strategy and a plan of action that included the capacity building of demobilised soldiers in the culture of dialogue and peace and in particular in the area of conflict resolution and transformation at community level.

### ***2.3. Of the Need for Growth and the Growth of Needs.***

At the beginning of the project the management base was not solid. The project was co-ordinated by three demobilised soldiers, one of whom was a woman. The project didn't have any demobilised soldiers that had the technical capacity to manage the project. There was a lot of goodwill to start the initiative, but first there was a need to overcome the constraints that inhibited the growth of the project. The limitations can be summarised as the absence of financial and human resources with technical competence and professional preparation.

Based on the agreement signed between the Demobilised Soldiers Association of Nicaragua, and with financing from TROCAIRE the three coo-coordinators of PPPD participated, in 1996, in a training course offered by the Centre for International Studies of Nicaragua. The eight-month course aimed to train the participants in Peace Education material. The course had both theoretical and practical components. The three-week theoretical sessions were held in the Centre for International Studies. The practical sessions were carried out in different districts in Mozambique.


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<sup>17</sup> These are discussed and analysed in (2.10), under the title "The Problems of Putting Theory in Practice."

After the completion of the course with the skills and knowledge obtained from the course the participants began to put into place the basis for the creation of the network of peace promoters in Mozambique. In the first place an activity plan was prepared that lasted for six months and is described below.

#### **2.4. The first plan**

The plan was developed as a basis for the definition of objectives; to establish criteria for the selection of the areas of intervention; and for the definition of the phases that needed to achieve the objectives. The process is shown below in figure 3.



The plan defined the main objectives as the following

- Alleviate and or eliminate poverty of the demobilised soldier and provide them with basic knowledge for self-reintegration and productive activities;
- Collect opinions of demobilised soldiers and the communities about the employment opportunities that exist in the localities and their accessibility;
- Widen the objectives of AMODEG and AEMIMO through the carrying out of courses for demobilised soldiers in the identification and preparation of projects, feasibility studies and management of projects, support in handling the bureaucratic procedures for obtaining of land;
- Collect opinions and proposals from demobilised soldiers about the possibility of creating an International Demobilised Soldiers Federation.
- Identify the leaders of the demobilised soldiers, at community level, who will encourage cooperation between the demobilised soldiers in the implementation of the various projects.

After the definition of the objectives of the first plan, there followed the identification of the pilot areas with a view to carrying out the first field experiences. However, it was clear that the selection of the areas should not be done in an arbitrary way but taking into account some guiding criteria. Three criteria were identified for the choice of the first zones for intervention:

- Areas with the highest number of demobilised soldiers;

- Areas with the highest number of conflicts between demobilised soldiers and between the demobilised soldiers and the receiving communities;
- Human and financial resources available to the programme

### ***2.5. The First Areas of Intervention***

Using the criteria stated above the following provinces and respective districts were identified:

- Province of Nampula: Meconta, Mogovolas and Nampula-centre;
- Province of Zambézia: Quelimane, Namacurra and Mocuba; and
- Province of Sofala: Beira, Nhamatanda and Dondo.

### ***2.6. The Phases of the Plan***

The Plan of Activities defined three specific areas of action to achieve the stated objectives. Each phase had specific objectives, timetable and methodologies. The phases were as follows:

- Experimental phase – creation of a network of promoters;
- Phase of capacity building of the peace promoters;

- Phase of spreading the programme to district level;
- Implementation phase .

### **2.6.1. Experimental phase - creation of the PPPD network**

Specific objectives defined for this phase were as follows:

- Define the social and cultural structure of the communities included in the project;
- Define the level of reconciliation between the mobilised soldiers and the rest of the community;
- Define the degree of exclusion or marginalisation of the demobilised soldiers;
- Select 90 people, 30 per province and 10 per district to participate in the peace promoter's course.

### **2.6.2. Timetable**

This phase ran during the month of May in the three provinces previously selected:

- Nampula Province : Meconta, Mogovolas and Nampula city. On the 6th, 7th and 8th of May;

- Zambezia Province - Quelimane city, Namacurra and Mocuba. On the 11<sup>th</sup>, 12<sup>th</sup> and 13<sup>th</sup> of May;
- Sofala Province : Nhamatanda, Dondo and Beira . 15th, 16th and 17th of May.

### **2.6.3. Methodology**

Group work with the aid of a discussion guide was used as the main technique during the seminars. The participants were divided into groups, and each group had a moderator that stimulated the participants to discuss the topics under consideration. The discussion guide identified three main topics namely Reconciliation, Gender and Exclusion. The groups used the following questions for reflection:

1. The circumstances and ways in which the demobilised soldiers participate in the projects that are implemented by the central government, the local authorities, the NGO's and/or religious institutions;
2. Ways in which to achieve the socio-cultural, political and economic reintegration of demobilised soldiers and disabled demobilised soldiers in the short, medium and long term;
3. Development of strategies that deepen the culture and relationships of peace, and how the demobilised soldiers can contribute to this process.
4. The role of AMODEG / ADEMIMO in the reintegration of the demobilised soldiers;

5. Discuss the treatment of the demobilised soldiers and disabled demobilised soldiers by the state authorities (police, the army, legal system, etc) in relation to personal security and human rights;
6. The existence of armed men in communities and the potential instability they represent and the possible ways of approaching and resolving this question;
7. The degree of participation of women in the various integration programmes and the relationship between the female demobilised soldiers and male demobilised soldiers;
8. Observations about creating a programme for Peace Education in which the demobilised soldiers are the main actors.

#### **2.6.4. Results**

The results presented below take into consideration the consensus that was achieved for each issue in each discussion group. Thus;

- In relation to the first issue, it was concluded that demobilised soldiers did not participate in the discussion and preparation of the projects that have been designed for their benefit. In fact the projects were imposed and did not have any connection to local reality. For this reason the majority of the projects were weak;
- Concerning the second issue, the participants concluded that even though the general population is very poor, additional attention should be paid to the

demobilised soldiers/disabled demobilised soldiers taking into account the reasons for the poverty of this group. The participants also stated the need for the creation of mechanisms for the education of civil society and the Government with a view to positive supervision of the socio-economic reintegration of the demobilised soldiers;

- Concerning the third question, the participants demonstrated interest in developing activities with a view to maintaining peace but agreed that these same measures should be implemented with a set of economic incentives;
- Concerning the fourth issue, the participants concluded that the efficiency of AMODEG/ADEMIMO depends on improved co-ordination and dialogue between the different institutions that are dedicated to the reintegration of demobilised soldiers;
- The participants concluded about the fifth issue that there was discrimination against the demobilised soldiers/disabled demobilised soldiers by some of the government organs, as in the case of the Police. Examples were given of detention and bad treatment. They claimed that the fact of being demobilised soldiers meant they had no rights. Retirement pensions arrive late and sometimes do not reach the recipients and in general there is non compliance of the concession of land that was agreed upon in the General Peace Accord;
- In relation to the sixth issue, the participants decried the existence of armed men in their communities, they recognised the negative impact this had on the development of their communities and showed themselves willing to collaborate with the authorities in the dismantling of the armed gangs;

- On the seventh issue, the participants recognised that demobilised/disabled women did not participate in the reintegration programmes, due to sexual discrimination and omission on the part of the designers of the programmes. They also concluded that the relationship between the different sexes of demobilised soldiers was influenced by sexual discrimination, they showed willingness to fight against this problem within the group;
- In relation to the last question, the participants concluded that the proposed programme was very important and should be continued. The meetings allowed the demobilised soldiers/disabled demobilised soldiers to exchange experiences in an atmosphere of free speech, and they recommended that the promotion of peace should be accompanied by economic projects.

#### **2.6.5. Conclusions**

Based on the nine seminars carried out in this phase it was possible to reach the following conclusions:

1. The participants showed themselves receptive and willing to carry out and continue with the plan that had been previously established notwithstanding the existence of problems. It is believed that these problems can, in time, be overcome;
2. There was a need to develop a permanent programme, accompanied by investment (community investment projects) in order to address the material needs that the communities face;

3. There was a need to work at grass-roots level;
4. The programme should choose ten demobilised soldiers in each district and city. These demobilised soldiers would then constitute the network of peace promoters. In total ninety demobilised soldiers were registered and later would take part in a capacity building course on peace promotion.

#### **2.6.6. Difficulties**

During the implementation phase a number of problems arose due to inexperience in the carrying out of these type of events, namely:

- Weak participation of women and the traditional leaders due to problems with the invitations and the dissemination of information about the meetings; and
- Lack of timely information about the logistical conditions in the districts where the seminars were held.

#### ***2.7. Capacity Building Phase of the PPPD network.***

Two months after the constitution of the PPPD network, courses for capacity building were carried out in the provinces. Three seminars were held, focusing on the following subjects:

- Community development;
- Gender; and

- Conflict resolution and transformation.

After the course the promoters were charged with the task of returning to their districts to disseminate the knowledge they had acquired.

#### 2.7.1. Programming (timetable)

This phase ran through the months of July and August in the selected provincial capitals:

- Nampula – Nampula city : 29th and 31st of July. 24 of the 30 previously selected promoters participated;
- Zambezia – Quelimane city: 3rd to the 5th of August. 29 of the 30 promoters participated;
- Sofala – Beira city: 8th of August. 29 of the 30 promoters participated.

#### 2.7.2. Methodology

The techniques in the seminars used were group work and lectures. The participants were introduced to the proposed subjects and these were then discussed in groups in order that agreement was reached on the subject. A facilitator guided each session and the same procedure was carried out in each Province.

The participants were actively involved in all the sessions and thought that the subject matter was relevant and added positively to their knowledge:

- The topic of Community Development built the capacity of the promoters to prepare and implement projects that could contribute to the resolution of the socio-economic problems that the demobilised soldiers/disabled demobilised soldiers were faced with in their home communities. The module also helped the demobilised soldiers/disabled demobilised soldiers to develop skills to work together based on the identification of common objectives with the aim of positively transforming their communities.
  
- The topic dealing with Gender engendered the most participation of the people on the courses. One of the issues raised was the definition of violence against women due to interpretations of the meaning of the words. However, the participants agreed that it was necessary to eradicate discrimination against women including physical violence. Civic education was one of the ways identified to sensitise the population in the fight against all discrimination against women, while still emphasised the need to look at the cultural context when approaching this subject.
  
- The participants were all in agreement about the importance of the topic Conflict Resolution and Transformation. The development of their communities depends on the existence of peace, stability and social harmony. They cited examples of divisions that exist within certain communities: societies that marginalize the demobilised soldiers; demobilised soldiers that consider themselves superior to the rest of the community members; and situations where refugees and people affected by the war receive special treatment in the distribution of goods, even though the rest of the community is equally poor.

The participants stated that the weak development of their communities was in part due to the existence of conflict and due to the lack of knowledge of mechanisms for resolution and transformation. The communities were constantly weakened in organisational terms because of the conflicts.

Many of the conflicts that were found in the different communities were due to party political loyalties. For this reason many of the participants showed high levels of interest in gaining more knowledge about the methods of conflict resolution and transformation.

It was also found that there is a certain profile for individuals that can mediate or resolve conflicts. The participants identified certain characteristics that would help the mediator to be recognised by the community as someone who could resolve conflict, these included, the age of the person, that the person have influence in the community and that the person be representative of the community.

### **2.7.3. Conclusions**

Lessons were learnt and conclusions drawn during the training period:

1. The demobilised and disabled demobilised soldiers represent enormous human potential. Notwithstanding their low academic levels all of them were able to discuss the subjects with intelligence, sincerity, in a friendly atmosphere, showing willingness to learn;
2. It is not everyone in the community that can become a mediator of conflicts. This responsibility will be attributed in accordance with certain characteristics that are highly valued within the community, as described above;

3. The problem of sexual discrimination against women should be gradually resolved as the communities are still dominated by traditional cultural values where the exclusion of women from decision-making is one of the main characteristics. Only through permanent education activities in the medium and long term will it be possible to achieve encouraging results in the fight against sexual discrimination;
4. The majority of the demobilised soldiers/disabled demobilised soldiers are convinced that the true process of reintegration must involve education and instruction and not simply the distribution of money and the financing of micro-projects. The micro-projects often do not succeed, in part due to the lack theoretical knowledge and experience in the management of micro-businesses. The participants stated that they would like to make up for lost time and return to their studies with the help of study grants;
5. The methods used to facilitate the workshops had to be adjusted to take into account the education levels of the participants.

#### **2.7.4. Difficulties**

The difficulties at this stage were as follows:

- Delay in the arrival of the methodological advisor from the Centre for International Studies in Nicaragua meant that the supporting teaching material was developed at the last minute;

- Successive alterations in the dates of the courses due to the lack of timely information about the arrival or not of the Technical Advisor from CEI. This lack of coordination with the CEI meant that the participants on the ground were also affected, with the result that some of the selected participants did not arrive for the training;
- Weak participation of the media (particularly in Nampula);
- Printing errors in the manual (Support texts);
- Delays in the transfer of project funds.

### ***2.8. Programme Implementation at District Level***

Four months after the course the implementation of the programme at district level began, led by the provincial promoters and supervised by the three project coordinators. This phase had the following objectives:

- 1). Transmit and disseminate the knowledge acquired during the course, and
- 2). Evaluate the degree to which the promoters managed mediation processes and have assimilated the subject matter.

The material to be transmitted to others was the same as had been taught during the course, namely, Community Development, Conflict Resolution and Transformation and Gender.

### 2.8.1. Timetable

This phase was carried out in all the districts and followed the timetable below:

- Nampula – Nampula city (Muetale), Meconta and Mogovolas: 24th, 26th and 27th of December, 1996;
- Zambezia – Quelimane city ( Locality of Sococo), Namacurra and Mocuba: 24th and 27th of December;
- Sofala - Nhamatanda, Dondo and Beira city : 26th, 27th and 28th of December .

### 2.8.2. Outcomes

The outcomes are presented by province where the plan was implemented, namely:

#### **a). Nampula Province**

Three seminars were held in Nampula Province. In the area of Muetale, Police Officers, Traditional leaders, members of the media were present as well as the demobilised soldiers. 40 people participated.

The three promoters facilitated the meeting competently, reflecting the quality of preparation they had received. The lack of time meant that the subjects under discussion were not debated very deeply. A number of suggestions were made at the end of the meeting, namely:

- The need to unite the strengthens of the community in order to face the severity of the problems linked to low economic possibilities and the disintegration of the social fabric;
- The need to continue the training in all the subjects covered;
- The programme should be promoted at higher levels of the Provincial Government.

In the District of Meconta, 40 people attended the seminar, among them traditional leaders. The seminar was facilitated by 5 promoters. The seminar was carried out in the local language (Macua) as not all of the participants could understand the official language (Portuguese). The main conclusions from this seminar were:

- The need to allow more time for the seminar in order that the subject matter could be better presented and assimilated; and
- The inclusion of local languages in the facilitation of the subject matter in order to ensure the community could participate fully in the seminar.

In the district of Mogovolas there were 38 participants in the seminar, including traditional leaders and was facilitated by 5 peace promoters. At the beginning of the seminar there was a misunderstanding about the aim of the seminar with the local traditional leader, the “Regulo”. The Regulo felt that the programme had a political character. If this misinterpretation had continued it would have made the work untenable, but the peace promoters were able to clarify the real aims of the seminar with the Regulo, and work was able to continue. The main conclusions of

this seminar was that it was not only necessary to continue with the programme, but that in the next meeting more time should be made available in order to improve the transmission and assimilation of the topics under discussion.

#### **b). Zambezia Province**

In the Zambezia Province this phase started in Sococo locality, which is found on the edge of Quelimane city. This locality is exceptional in that many of the inhabitants are disabled demobilised soldiers and is considered to be one the most conflict prone zones post war. Five peace promoters facilitated the seminar, with support from one of the members of the central team. 51 people participated in the seminar, including, demobilised soldiers, disabled demobilised soldiers, the general population and local authorities.

After the presentation of the subjects to be covered during the seminar, most interest was shown in the topic dealing with the resolution and/or transformation of conflicts, due to the high level of conflict in the area. The reaction of the population demonstrated how much they wanted to change the existing situation. The most important recommendations from this meeting were:

- The local promoters should work closely with the community, assisting them in the different areas that they were skilled in; and
  
- More time should be allowed for the discussion of the subjects in order that the ideas could be better assimilated and subsequently better applied in practice.

In the districts of Namacurra and Mocuba participants were drawn from the local population, including the district authorities, the traditional leader, demobilised soldiers and disabled demobilised soldiers, and facilitated by the peace promoters.

In the District of Namacurra the team of promoters includes a local traditional leader, “Regulo”, a health worker, a primary school teacher, and is supported by the institutions linked to community development, namely the Directorates of Education and Rural Water. After the presentation of the three topics, there followed a period of debate and the following recommendations were made at the end of the meeting:

- The need for the participation of the promoters in the mediation of an on-going conflict in the district between an International Organisation and the population of the locality of Mutange about the localisation for the building of a new primary school;
- Peace promoters should be involved in research about the needs of the communities in the localities, where some District Directorates, in particular the Directorate of Education, have not been consulting the population and imposing decisions;
- Carry out more presentations with the populations about community development in areas where it has been shown that there is a need for this type of capacity building. This recommendation was immediately put into effect in the locality of Muiebele, where at the request of the Administrator, a presentation was made which resulted in the clearing of two large areas that are to be used for the development of a community project;

- The need to eradicate all forms of discrimination against women and the creation of equal opportunities for both men and women to participate in community development programmes;
- The absolute need to observe the cultural particularities in each area of intervention when discussing the topics.

**c). Sofala Province**

In the district of Nhamatanda in the Province of Sofala, 38 people participated of the 40 initially invited. Three peace promoters facilitated the seminar and a member of the central office team gave support. The performance of the promoters was good, showing that they had assimilated the material well during the training phase. The participants were very interested in the seminar. The majority of the participants asked questions and made contribution in a systematic and constructive way during the seminar. A number of recommendations were made, of which the most important are presented below:

- The need for the continuation of the programme due to its important contribution to the improvement of the lives of the people in the community;
- The need to deepen the discussion of the topics in order to improve assimilation of the material and ensure the efficient application into practice;
- The need to translate the presentations into local languages to allow for greater participation and involvement of the communities;

- The need to hold further seminars to discuss more thoroughly and consolidate the topics learnt during the training phase;
- The need for the central level team to continue to advise and carry out continual capacity building of the provincial peace promoters;
- The topic of community development should be supported by funds for small profit making projects;
- In the topic dealing with gender it is important to take cultural aspects into consideration for each zone, and to take a gradual approach to implementation.

### ***2.9. Implementation Phase***

This phase began in 1997 and is still underway. The implementation phase consists of the practical application of the skills learnt. In all of the provinces the promoters participated in the development of their communities, and have obtained the following results, presented below by province:

#### **a). Zambezia Province**

In Zambezia, in the district of Namacurra, the promoters were requested to mediate a conflict that was putting the population, UNICEF and the District Government on opposite sides. The reason for the conflict was the localisation of a Primary School that was to be constructed. The population did not agree with the

procedures that had taken place to decide on the location of the school. Negotiations had not taken place before the decision and the selected land was occupied by properties owned by members of the community.

The peace promoters worked with a group of criminals and persuaded them to give up their arms. This group had previously created an atmosphere of instability and insecurity as they regularly carried out armed assaults on the cars of residents. The group agreed to give up their arms that were later given to the police. This was followed by a process for the reintegration of the members of the group into the community.

The promoters gave a number of presentations to firms and in the community about the programme and relations between the demobilised soldiers and the governmental institutions improved considerably in Namialo according to the local government personnel. Also in this district, the poor relations between the demobilised soldiers, the community and the Cotton Company improved as a result of the intervention of the promoters;

The promoters received certificates in recognitions of the work that they carried out for the development of the communities.

#### **b). Nampula Province**

In Nampula sensitisation exercises were carried out with the population to detect arms caches. People voluntarily gave up their arms to the peace promoters, the arms were subsequently handed over to the police;

### **c). Sofala Province**

In the Province of Sofala one of the peace promoters was asked by the RENAMO party to mediate in a dispute between members of the party. Since 1994 the party had promised the disabled demobilised soldiers, who were members of the party, that they would improve the conditions of the Disabled Centre in Savana, where the demobilised soldiers were living. This had not happened, and the disabled soldiers began protesting violently to the Party Headquarters about the lack of pensions, lack of prostheses and all the promises that had not been fulfilled by their party. Given this situation, the head of the party at provincial level requested the intervention of the peace promoters to help in the resolution of this problem.

The promoters mediated in a conflict between the disabled demobilised soldiers and the firm, Public Transport of Beira. The firm had cut the free passes on the buses and this had caused considerable unrest. The firm cut this benefit without giving any explanation. The disabled demobilised soldiers began to protest and managed to close the offices of the firm. The peace promoters were called to mediate in the conflict.

The promoters mediated in a conflict between the demobilised soldiers and their own association, AMODEG (Sofala branch). The association members accused the directors of not carrying out their duties and demanded the immediate resignation of the management. The promoters were called to mediate in the conflict and it was decided to call a general meeting in order to resolve the differences.

The promoters also carried out community mobilisation exercises in order that the population would participate in the building of a school and a health post.

### ***2.10. Problems with Putting Theory into Practice***

The programme has not passed unscathed during the process of mediation and resolution of conflicts. There have been a number of problems with putting theory into practice, which led to learning experiences and have enriched the programme.

When the programme began it was restricted to the target group of demobilised soldiers and disabled demobilised soldiers, which at the beginning was the very reason for the programme. But as time went by it became clear that the appearance of the peace promoters was adding additional layers to existing local institutions, and that this could, in some circumstances, be dangerous to stability and social harmony within the communities for two reasons:

In the first place the communities already had institutions for the resolution of conflicts<sup>18</sup> and that, in principle, all villagers, including the demobilised soldiers and the disabled demobilised soldiers, should use these institutions when there are any type of problems.

In the second place, the existence of demobilised soldiers as peace promoters had some merit, however, it also perpetuated the separate identify of demobilised soldiers as a sub-group of individuals whose problems were distinct from other members of the same communities.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> Victor Igreja, "Domestic Courts : The case of the Ndaus in Mossurize", in NOTÍCIAS, 10/6/97, p.2. This article spoke about the existence of a conflict resolution mechanism in private space for family issues, and that there were also mechanisms in the public arena. This last mechanism is generic in many rural communities and is known as local traditional authorities, in oother areas it may be known by other designations, as is the case of the District of Gorongosa where the traditional authorities are known as the "Nádegas dos Velhos."

<sup>19</sup> Victor Igreja, "Os Restos da Guerra em Moçambique."

These two factors had serious implications. On one hand, the project could be contributing, without this being the objective, to the further division of the communities, creating conditions, not for the strengthening of the concept of community, but for fragmentation and disintegration in the medium and long term. On the other hand, the community may continue to be held prisoner to a hated and disagreeable history, while the post war period should be used to reunite the communities and all of the groups without reference to their pasts, working together to re-built the shared areas of community life.

This problem, that at first sight appeared to be without solution, raised two crucial questions namely, are we facing a fundamental mistake in the project conception that would mean dismantling piece by piece the programme and starting the processes from the beginning? Or are we only facing the need to add to the guiding principles that gave rise to the project?

The resolution of this problem came with the recognition that the project was not entirely independent of the culture within which it was working, rather the reverse, that it was necessary to adjust the programme to the socio-cultural and political realities, even when these were problematic. The **Principle of Non Exclusion** was introduced into the programme in recognition of this situation.

This guiding principle was based on the premise that the project should not exclude other existing community structures, in fact should open up and carry out the integration on two fronts, integrate the project within the local institutions and, at the same time, integrate the local institutions into the project.

The project also faced another problem. There was an expressed wish to make the programme as participatory as possible, because this was the only way that would

bring success to the endeavour, but the exclusive use of the official language, Portuguese, in the different phases, meant that this was not possible. It had been over-looked that in the rural areas only a minority of people speak Portuguese, and the local languages are the main form of communication. This problem was resolved by introducing the **Principle of Linguistic Integration**.

This principle is based on the premise that local languages should always be used, not merely for convenience but because more and better participation of the communities leads to the cultural identification of the project with socially acceptable models for these communities and language is one of the main tenets for identification.

### **III. From PPPD to PROPAZ**

During the implementation phase there were continual organisational problems at central level that needed to be corrected. The programme was co-ordinated by three promoters but there was no clear distribution of tasks and responsibilities, and the organisational structure was not defined. The three co-ordinators were at the same hierarchical level within the organisation. This created conflicts and contradictions in the running of the programme.

The programme was using a name that was not, in bureaucratic terms, official. There was constant interference, by the heads of AMODEG and ADEMIMO, in the running of the programme, which made the progress towards agreed tasks difficult to attain. If, even at the start of the programme, it was clear that the programme needed to expand, during the implementation phase, this became ever more apparent as the theory was put into practice. The programme was facing a

growth crisis, and it was evident that it was critical to re-organise the programme or face the weakening and possible disintegration of the organisation.


### **3.1. The Birth of PROPAZ**


In April 1997 a meeting was held with the main aim of structuring the programme. It was decided that the programme was lacking a head and that one of the three coordinators should take the position due to their knowledge of the programme. It was also decided that the head of the programme should be dynamic, have the ability to attract and identify partners and was accepted by the two institutions of AMODEG and ADEMIMO.

Given these characteristics Jacinta Jorge was chosen as the director of the programme, she would continue to receive support from the two project officers, Salomão Mungói and Armando Fulane. The programme became autonomous administratively and financially from the two institutions of AMODEG and ADEMIMO. The first task of the Director was to distribute responsibilities and define the structure of the organisation.

The programme had a Director and two officers that made up the national or central team. At provincial level the teams were made up of five trained peace promoters that were to be managed by a coordinator. The structure can be seen in fig.4.

#### **Organisational Structure of PROPAZ**







Each of the project officers in the central team was given different responsibilities and each was responsible for different provinces. There was no hierarchical difference between the two posts, and both were accountable to the Director..

One of the officers, Salomão Mungói, was responsible for the areas of administration, finance, documentation, planning and was also given the responsibility of supervising the Province of Zambezia.

The other officer, Armando Fulane, was responsible for the areas of capacity building, training in conflict prevention and intervention and was also responsible for the Provinces of Sofala and Maputo. The last province mentioned was included later in the programme. The Director in addition to the responsibility for managing the programme was also responsible for the Province of Nampula. The model of the organisation at central level can be seen in fig 5

**Central Administrative Structure**





The objectives of the programme were redefined, the criteria for the selection of the peace promoters was defined, the programme adopted a new name and was officially baptised PROPAZ, i.e., The Programme for the Promotion of Peace. The word “development” was taken out from the previous name of the programme and the programme was expanded to Maputo. Initially Maputo was excluded from the programme in order not to feed the idea that the south of the country was privileged in terms of project implementation. But as the programme was committed to gradual expansion, the province of Maputo was included as it met all criteria for inclusion, namely, there were a large number of demobilised soldiers and disabled demobilised soldiers with few financial means.

### 3.2. *The Goals of PROPAZ*

- Create initiatives for the building of peace with veterans.
- Contribute to the development and consolidation of the process of social reintegration and the non- violent resolution of conflict.
- Promote the equal participation of female demobilised soldiers in peace initiatives and in local level reintegration.

### ***3.3. Putting PROPAZ into Operation***

- Capacity building for peace.
- Prevention of violence.
- Intervention in real conflicts.
- Community development.
- Training in civic values .

### ***3.4. Selection Criteria***

- Demonstration of interest in peace promotion as a way of reunifying communities dismantled through armed conflict;
- Minimum ability to write and communicate in Portuguese;
- Community leadership skills, good reputation and sense of responsibility;
- Be part of the target group of demobilised soldiers/disabled demobilised soldiers;
- Be part of the community and interested in the development of the community.

As part of the initial feedback it was possible to make a clear definition of the project, its objectives and tasks. The experience that had been gained since the beginning of the programme was used to prepare a Strategic Plan for implementation between 1999-2001. Before going into detail about the process of preparing the strategic plan we will present the conclusions of the first phase of the PPPD and the later transformation into the PPP.

#### **IV. Conclusions**

The project for peace promotion at community level has a long history that has been described in the previous chapters. Up to this point we have described the creation and development of PROPAZ. This project came about through the initiatives of the demobilised soldiers of the Government and RENAMO armies. The programme was developed taking into account six fundamental principles: the principle of reconciliation and national unity, integration, gender, non-exclusion and linguistic integration. Since the beginning, the programme supported peaceful conflict resolution and transformation. A climate of stability was created in the communities where the project was installed as a result of the direct involvement of the demobilised soldiers in the promotion of peace and the culture of dialogue. The need to pacify and stabilise the communities affected by the war was the main theme of the programme.

The experience acquired offered the possibility of understanding the basis for the definition of the problem of conflict and the later development of strategies for resolution. During the initial phase it was found that the type and intensity of the conflicts were very different, i.e., they varied according to the circumstances and therefore, the strategies for resolution, mediation and transformation were in a state of permanent adaptation. As an example we can look at the cases of the province of Maputo and the province of Sofala. In Maputo, the existence of arms

caches and unidentified mined areas was one of the main conflict areas. In this case the promoters worked to sensitise the population about the need to denounce the arms caches. While in Sofala, for example, the conflicts often manifested in physical violence, and in these cases the strategies for mediation were different.

PROPAZ has received considerable support from international partners. Important lessons have been learnt from the first years of work. Based on these experiences it was possible to develop a three-year strategic plan that is described in the following chapter.

#### **V. Strategic Plan, 1999 - 2001**

This plan was the result of the experiences gained during the first period of the existence of PROPAZ. Participatory planning was used to develop the strategic plan. The different promoters in the intervention areas contributed through participation in seminars and discussion groups. The main contributions can be summarised in the following way:

1. Improve the capacity of the organisation in the management of the human and financial resources;
2. Creation of a permanent network of peace promoters;
3. Expansion of the programme to other Provinces;
4. Carry out regular exchange visits with the countries of SADC, and other countries that have had similar experiences with armed conflicts;

5. Encourage community participation in conflict transformation, the conception and promotion of community projects;
6. Legalise the programme;
7. Create a self-sustaining basis for the programme through the implementation of income generating projects and the increase of national and foreign partners;
8. Publish an information bulletin.

These recommendations were used to define the basis of the new plan. However, there were no major alterations to the work initially developed. The plan defined new objectives and a three-year timeframe for implementation.

### ***5.1. Objectives of Strategic Plan***

In this crucial phase the following objectives were defined:

- 1) Develop initial and refresher training for the provincial facilitators and the local peace promoters in conflict mediation and resolution through the use of participatory techniques;
- 2) Develop community education for peace and conflict resolution reaching the community leaders;

- 3) Create conflict resolution groups in the regions where these groups do not exist at present;
- 4) Produce teaching material about the strategies for the promotion of peace, reconciliation and national unity adapted to the different social-cultural and political realities in the intervention zones;
- 5) Strengthen local capacity and 'know-how' in the existing twelve districts where PROPAZ has a programme;
- 6) Increase the number of districts reached by the project; and
- 7) Organise and direct pro-peace campaigns at national, regional and international level.

### ***5.2. Expected outcomes***

After the conclusion of the strategic plan the expected outcomes are:

- 1) Twenty provincial facilitators will be trained in advanced techniques for conflict resolution, the psychology of conflicts, gender, community mobilisation and facilitation;
- 2) The local promoters will have carried out monthly community meetings to raise the consciousness of the communities about peace promotion, reconciliation and national unity and the peaceful resolution of conflicts;

- 3) Eighteen groups for conflict resolution and transformation will have been created;
- 4) Twenty provincial facilitators will have received refresher courses using teaching materials that are sensitive to the socio-cultural and political realities of each province;
- 5) Four teams of peace promoters at provincial level will have been trained in the techniques of conflict resolution, mediation and transformation in households and communities;
- 6) Increased numbers of peace promoters from seventy to ninety;
- 7) Increase the number of districts from twelve to eighteen; and
- 8) Promote peace, unity and national reconciliation campaigns at local, regional and international level.

### ***5.3. Putting the plan into operation***

One of the crucial issues that had followed from the evolution of the project is linked to relationship between “local initiative”, “external resources” and “local expansion.” The results of this interaction that involved the direct stakeholders led to a change in the original structure of PROPAZ (see 3.1. Fig 4) during the operational phase of the strategic plan. The Director of the Programme no longer took on the additional role of project officer with responsibility for Nampula. The programme in this province was allocated to Salomão Mungoi and the Director began to take over more functions in the Maputo central office.

In the first year (1999) of operations the following activities were developed:

- 1) Monitoring visits by the central team to the Provinces;
- 2) Creation of Conflict Resolution groups;
- 3) Reorganisation of the working conditions through the acquiring of offices and the buying of office equipment and furniture;
- 4) Carry out training of trainers courses;
- 5) Carry out District Promoters Courses;
- 6) Visits of the trainers to the Districts;
- 7) English course for two members of the central team ; and
- 8) Promotion of peace campaigns in the Southern African Region.

The project officers, Mungoi and Armando Fulane, managed the operational phase at community level. The work carried out in the Provinces of Zambezia, Nampula, Sofala and Maputo is described below:

#### **a) Provinces of Nampula and Zambézia**

In these Provinces, the first phases of implementation consisted in local level strategic planning, analysis of the relationship between AMODEG and ADEMIMO (characterised by permanent conflict), establishing mechanisms to harmonise the documentation of the conflicts resolved and the activities carried out at local level.

During this phase there were problems with teams of promoters in Quelimane .<sup>20</sup> The main reason for the problems was due to the fact that the teams worked in the urban area where the demand for money for survival is often critical. The promoters did not have any income and the project does not have resources to satisfy this important demand. The promoters would only participate in the programme if they received a salary or a subsidy that would allow them to survive. The lack of financial incentive is a permanent obstacle for the effective implementation of the programme. The other problem is due to the lack of dialogue between the promoters that has also affected the programme performance at local level.

During the supervision visits the central team attempted to mediate the existing conflicts between AMODEG and ADEMIMO. Since the beginning of the programme the two organisations have been in conflict. The organisations work from a basis of instability and try to find ways of transferring their problems to the PROPAZ organisation. The relationship is characterised by constant threats and use of violence by AMODEG and ADEMIMO. This creates a significant problem for PROPAZ, on one hand PROPAZ seeks to mediate and resolve conflicts at community level, while on the other hand, conflicts created by AMODEG and ADEMIMO often come to rest at the door of PROPAZ, creating an atmosphere that could denigrate the image and reputation of PROPAZ, and continues to feed public opinion that “the demobilised soldiers are individuals that are troublesome, confused and violent”. In the short and long term there appears to exist two possible solutions to put an end to this situation. First, the management of PROPAZ, after the termination of the strategic plan, dissolve the programme and

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<sup>20</sup> This situation is not only true for Quelimane. In nearly all of the cities the absence of financial incentives for the provincial facilitators and promoters constantly impedes the functioning of the local teams. The same is not true in the rural areas where the district promoters are involved in mediation and conflict resolution without the need for financial incentives.

each goes about their own lives. The second option is that the management of PROPAZ transforms the programme into an independent organisation with its own statutes and in this way can continue to operate in the community, far from the climate of instability characterised by AMODEG and ADEMIMO. The second option seems to be the most reasonable and something that should be done as soon as possible.

#### **b). Provinces of Sofala and Maputo**

In these two provinces the strategic plan is being carried out as planned. The three teams of peace promoters in Beira, Dondo and Nhamatanda continue to carry out presentations in the communities and work with the traditional community leaders. The main obstacle to work has been the lack of financial resources to pay for the costs of travel and food when the presentations are made in areas far from their homes.

In order to overcome this problem the promoters have proposed that they organise income-generating projects together in order to raise funds to pay for some of the work related costs, and also provide a small fund to pay medical or funeral costs of promoters and their families.

In Maputo province, specifically in the districts of Moamba, Matuutuine and Magude, the promoters continue with their civic education programme in the different localities. One of the special features of this province is the importance of work related to arms caches and the localisation of ante-personnel mines, which represents one of the most important community problems. The civic education campaigns consist of sensitisation of the members of the community in the

identification of the arms caches in order that they can be destroyed and the handing over of arms. Concrete results have been achieved in the districts of Moamba and Matatuine, where, with the involvement of the promoters, arms were handed to authorities for destruction. A formal agreement was signed with the Police and PROPAZ stating commitment to work in strict collaboration. In the agreement PROPAZ have the responsibility to develop, in the communities, a peace culture, involving abstaining from the use of arms, while the Police have the responsibility to collect and destroy the arms. Images of some of the guns that have been deactivated in these community campaigns can be found attached to this document.

In the four provinces the creation of groups for the resolution of conflicts was carried out without many problems. The promoters, through the participatory meetings, were able to select influential members of the communities, namely, Regulos, religious leaders, teachers and others who, in coordination with the promoters, support the conflict resolution work when requested by the communities. This task was carried out without difficulties in the Province of Zambezia (districts of Ivagalane and Inhangome, and in the city of Quelimane) and in the district of Maringue in Sofala.

#### ***5.4. Conflicts and How they are Played out at Local Level***

Since the beginning of the Strategic Plan, PROPAZ has been involved in the resolution of 347 documented conflicts in the four provinces where the programme is active. In Nampula – 300 cases, Zambezia – 12, Sofala – 15 and Maputo – 20. There follows a description of these cases by Province:

## **a). Nampula Province**

In this province the promoters were involved in the mediation and resolution of around 300 conflicts. Three cases are described below involving land tenure, divorce, stealing by children that gave rise to inter-family disputes.

### **1. Land conflicts**

Two families were involved in a conflict because of the boundaries of their farms. The two families disputed the same boundaries and one of them took a piece of land unjustly. Over time the conflict spread from the two families directly involved to their extended families, finally involving over 15 people. At this point the conflict changed from being a family affair to becoming an issue that involved the community.

After the families had failed in various attempts to resolve the issue between them, and because they had heard about PROPAZ, one of families asked the district peace promoters to present the case. Before the intervention of PROPAZ the families agreed that they could mediate in the conflict. The promoters of PROPAZ heard each family separately and then brought the families together to discuss the issue. Consensus was arrived at and the two families accepted the terms of the solution to the conflict.

### **2. Divorce**

The husband, after a long period of endless arguments and disagreements, abandoned his home leaving the wife alone with five young children. The wife could not accept the situation and asked the peace promoters to intervene. In this

case the peace promoter was the traditional leader, who using mediation techniques resolved the conflict, and the couple began to live together again

### **3. Stealing**

A group of young children stole cashew nuts from a neighbour. The victims threatened drastic measures against the children. The families of the children tried to protect their offspring and the conflict grew to include all members of the families. The owners of the cashew nuts demanded payment for the stolen nuts in money, and they would not accept a formal apology or the return of the nuts. One of the families requested the support of the peace promoters and using mediation techniques the issue was settled peacefully.

#### **b). Zambezia Province**

In this province the promoters were involved in the resolution of around 12 conflicts. One of the most complicated conflicts that the promoters were involved in was related to the violation of human rights perpetrated by an influential member of the community. This case is described below.

##### **1. Private Prisons**

In the District of Namacurra anyone who committed an infraction in the community was put into a private prison under the administration of the Regulo Motho (traditional leader). The prisoners were tortured and sometimes forced to take burning cinders from the fire into their mouths. The promoters in coordination with the District Government and the community in general developed public

education campaigns for peace in order to convince the Regulo and his staff to stop the practice. After a number of civic education sessions the Regulo accepted to stop this way of carrying out justice. The Regulo closed the prisons, and he has not returned to using violence as a way of metering out justice.

### **c) Sofala Province**

In Sofala province the promoters were involved in the resolution and transformation of around 15 conflicts. The conflicts ranged from acts of corruption, and labour disputes to tribal behaviour. Some of the cases are described below:

#### **1. Conflicts between disabled ex-soldiers and the Hospital**

The disabled ex-soldiers abused their right to free health treatment. Using bribes they infiltrated patients into the hospital to receive treatment. The health personnel found out about this practice and a conflict was created. The disabled ex-soldiers did not want to stop the corrupt practices so the hospital authorities through the Health Directorate, asked the peace promoters to help to resolve the problem. Through civic education the disabled ex-soldiers stopped this practice and the conflict was resolved.

#### **2. Conflict between a Portuguese Firm and Workers.**

A Portuguese firm was practicing racism against the workers. The workers sought out the peace promoters to help resolve the conflict. The peace promoters

contacted the employer who recognised that the behaviour was wrong and promised to change his attitude.

### **3. Tribal Conflict**

In the district of Nhamatanda, the Tsacala group was the traditional landowner in the area and they took a very hostile stance against people of Ndau and Sena origin, who they considered to be foreigners. The manifestation of this discrimination was clear in the churches and in the public service. The promoters, through coordinated work with the local authorities and the pastors, began peace education, emphasising national unity and reconciliation. Gradually the areas of tension began to diminish, however, there is still a need for the continuation of peace education campaigns in the area.

#### **e). Province of Maputo**

In this province the promoters were involved in the resolution and transformation of twenty conflicts. The conflicts varied from marital infidelity with physical violence, lack of trust in the community, labour conflicts to land tenure problems. Some of the cases are described below:

##### **1. Marital Infidelities and Physical Violence**

Raimundo was married to Meriamo, but had sexual relations with Rosita, with whom he had one child. Rosita decided to have the child in order to provoke a reaction from Meriamo, the official wife. Meriamo responded with violence and attacked her husband and his lover. Raimundo's brother decided to ask the peace

promoters to intervene in the dispute. The team worked with the people involved and a consensual solution was found to resolve the problem.

## **2. Lack of Trust in the Community**

MF employed LM to build a water tank in exchange for a cow. In order to carry out the work LM and his truck had to go often to MF's house. The population of the village saw the truck of LM but could not understand the reasons for his constant presence in the village. In this area the village people had been victims of cattle rustling, where the cattle were stolen using trucks. One day they decided to arrest LM and hold his truck and accused him of cattle rustling. They then went even further and arrested MF, accusing him of planning to steal cattle. This caused panic within the community, as MF was also not trusted within the community. The peace promoters were asked to intervene in the situation. Using mediation techniques they were able to resolve the conflict.

## **3. Police Commander accuses Subordinate of Selling Drugs.**

The police commander accused his subordinate, another police officer, of being involved in trafficking of marijuana and put him into prison. The police officer in question was in prison for six months, at which point the family members learnt about PROPAZ. The peace promoters sought out the police commander in order to hear his version of what had actually happened, but also presented him with a series of facts that indicated that the police officer had not been involved in drug trafficking. As a consequence of this mediation more investigations were carried out and the conclusion was reached that the police officer was not guilty. The police officer was then set free.

#### **4. Social Instability in the Locality of Maguiguane**

In the period after the floods lists were compiled of affected people in order to carry out food distribution. The lists were not well compiled and some people received food whilst other did not. The population revolted, creating an atmosphere of instability. The Peace Promoters intervened to compile new lists in order that the food distribution would benefit all of the affected households.

#### **5. Labour conflict**

The firm P.D.H.L. recruited people to work under contract but did not define the duration of the contract. At the end of a certain period the firm dismissed all the workers without any warning and without paying wages owing to them.

The workers went on strike demanding their compensation money. The workers contacted PROPAZ to ask for help. PROPAZ listened the workers and then went to find the employers in order to hear their version of the story. The promoters were able to facilitate a meeting between the two parties, and the conflict was resolved peacefully. The employers paid the wages owing to the workers and the strike ended without further incidence.

#### **6. Social Conflict**

The farmer had had some land for a long-time when he decided to sell the land. But when he fenced in the land he included land belonging to other farmers. The population was angry and a sense of unrest reigned in the community. The

secretary of the village sought out PROPAZ in order to resolve the question. The promoters managed to resolve the question peacefully.

### **Conclusion**

In the three provinces there are both differences and similarities in the nature and type of conflicts. The variable character of conflicts does not allow an easy or simplified definition that could lead to a single perception or way of working with these conflicts. However, in general, the majority of the conflicts that PROPAZ has been called upon to mediate have been community problems. People come to PROPAZ in order to see their problems resolved in a peaceful way. The neutral role of PROPAZ and the methods used by the promoters create an atmosphere of trust between people, making PROPPAZ a resource that is available and accessible to all.

### ***5.5. Difficulties***

The implementation of the strategic plan did not pass without incidence: Various problems occurred, some of the important aspects are highlighted below:

1. The promoters faced obstacles in the expansion of the educational work in the rural areas furthest from the district centres. This was due to the lack of financial resources to support transport costs;
2. Trainers and promoters faced difficulties in dealings with the local authorities due to demands for the presentation of formal papers identifying them in their role as peace promoters;

3. Delays in the allocation of funds upset the rhythm and implementation of planned activities;

#### **5.6. Outside view. Evaluation..**

An outside view, i.e., an independent evaluation was part of the strategic plan in order to look at the potential and the limitations seen in the implementation phase, to generate ideas and define the basis for future work. The objectives of the evaluations, as defined in the Terms of Reference, included the following:

- a) Evaluate the performance of the programme at district, provincial and central level: How is the programme structured to respond to the planned activities ? What can be done to improve the organisational performance? Look at aspects of leadership and management, the organisational structure, communication and relationships with the various partners etc.
- b) Verify the degree with which the plan of action was carried out during the two-year period (how much of the plan was carried out). Why? Were alterations justified and adequate? Were the plans realistic? To what extent was the performance affected by unforeseeable events (floods in 2000 in the South and centre of the country and the floods in 2001 in Zambezia). Implications for the third year and recommendations for the future.
- c) Evaluate the social impact of the programme. What do the communities think has been improved with the implementation of the programme in the community? Is there more dialogue between people in the community? Are the methods for conflict resolution democratic? Do people go to the mediators to

resolve their conflicts? What has been the relationship of the programme with the community leaders? Recommendations?

- d) Consider the potential and limitations of the programme. What have been the problems faced by the programme at community, district, provincial and central level? Recommendations to strengthen the positive aspects and improve the weak aspects.
- e) Define the variation in terms of success in the different areas (districts) studied. In which geographical areas has the programme had more, or less success? What are the factors that seem to promote success and what are the difficulties? What lessons can be drawn?.
- f) Evaluate the methodology applied to see if it achieved the rhythm and level of community participation intended, as well as evaluating the adequacy of this methodology within the local context.

The main conclusions of this evaluation when discussing the potential and weaknesses, pointed to more constraints than potentials. But in general the evaluation was positive and made recommendations for the short and the medium term.

#### 5.6.1 Postive aspects

The main areas of potential highlighted by the team of evaluators were the following:

- a) Existence of a network of activists working at community level in the rural zones;
- b) Teams made-up of ex-soldiers from the two formerly belligerent armies, respecting gender equity, conferring balance and neutrality on the programme;
- c) The central office team, the trainers and some of the peace promoters show considerable talent and capacity in mediation and transformation of conflicts;
- d) The working methods and training methods emphasis horizontal exchange of experiences and there is a strong group culture.

#### 5.6.2. Negative Aspects

Some of the limitations of the programme are as follows:

- a) The fundamental conception of the programme is of conflict resolution while the communities they work in are predominately concerned with survival and poverty. There is a lack of integration of these two aspects in the programme.
- b) Planning of the work is concentrated on the activities and not on outcomes and impact.
- c) Information systems, including registration and documentation of cases and communication are not adequate.

- d) A large number of people expect to obtain material benefits from their participation in the programme (many of the promoters hope to receive a salary one day).
- e) There is very little teaching material available.
- f) PROPAZ has a troubled relationship with AMODEG and ADEMIMO and there is little debate on either side to discuss the problems.
- g) The material conditions of the provincial and district teams, are in general, bad and are not conducive to good quality programming (in particular the preservation of information).
- h) Lack of strategy that would allow the rapid expansion of the programme to other geographic areas and other target groups, at a time when the needs are great.

#### 5.6.3. Recommendations

The independent evaluation indicated that the programme was developing in a positive way and gave recommendations for the short and medium term.

##### 1) Short-term recommendations:

- a) Design and implement a programme for awareness raising and capacity building for peace promotion and resolution of conflicts for the managers of AMODEG and ADEMIMO, at central level, including, if possible, some of the provincial personnel.

- b) Debate with AMODEG and ADEMIMO the future development of the programme, the definition of the organisational structure and the intervention strategies with the demobilised soldiers. This programme should be undertaken with a view to deciding the future of PROPАЗ after the stipulated period of discussion.
- c) Share the strategic definitions, in a consultative way, with the members of the programme team, at the various levels of the organisation, in order to promote cohesion and ownership of the programme.
- d) Carry out a basic training course in management, after the definition of the organisational structure, in order to begin the process of adopting an appropriate management culture for the organisation.
- e) When expanding the activities to the new districts, give special attention to the composition of the teams, to ensure adequate representation of all the groups involved in the programme.

## 2) Medium term

- a) Define the impact indicators and outcomes in the community, and the evaluation methodologies for the work in order to integrate them in the next Strategic Plan.
- b) Develop an integrated information system appropriate for the information needs, including, filing system (data bank or other form), internal

communications systems (reporting forms) and the dissemination of information to the public and other interested parties.

- c) Prepare a Strategic Plan for 5 years, with a detailed programme for 3 years, that fits the perspectives of the defined programme. This plan should indicate how the programme will respond to the questions already raised by the evaluation, and also how it will respond to the issue of material and financial resources that are necessary to improve the work at provincial level (minimum working conditions, office space, funds for outreach work of the promoters, etc).

## **VI. Final Conclusions**

PROPAZ has been in existence for six years. This document has tried to present the full story of the history and working methods of the organisation. PROPAZ began as collection of reflections from demobilised soldiers that were not satisfied with the gradual process of marginalisation. At the beginning the structure of the organisation was simple and the work began in a garage. With external human and financial resources, through the problems brought about by putting the programme into practice and the lessons learnt the structure became more complex and the capacity to respond at community level grew. The number of promoter's increased, as did the number of provinces and districts where the project was implemented.

At the beginning of the initiative the aim was to work with demobilised soldiers (namely the officers, trainers and peace promoters) to help other demobilised soldiers resolve their problems and conflicts in a peaceful way. As the work developed and more experience was acquired the promoters became more confident in the communities and began to intervene in general community

conflicts. The promoters stopped being a resource just for the demobilised soldiers and became a resource for the community. PROPAZ worked within a set of principles namely: the Principle of Reconciliation and National Unity, Integration, Gender, Non-exclusion and Linguistic Integration. This qualitative leap has meant the recognition of PROPAZ as one of the few existing experiences of work of conflict resolution and transformation, reconciliation, national unity and community development in post war communities.

PROPAZ has, during this process, created a network of peace promoters throughout the country. This network still needs to grow in terms of quality and quantity in order to reach more zones where there are large concentrations of populations. However, there already is a collection of wisdom and knowledge, reflected in the pages of this document, that could be used as the basis of a response to other challenges and conflicts of a serious nature that affect the development of the country. The issue of HIV/AIDS, the careful observance and respect of human rights and the consolidation of democracy in general can rely on the support of the organisation of PROPAZ and the well-trained personnel that include the project officers, the trainers and peace promoters.

The reflections about the nature of association and local resources will continue. It is clear from the previous pages that the trainers and the promoters are more motivated in the rural areas. In the urban centres PROPAZ is faced with questions linked to financial resources for incentives that at present PROPAZ does not have. The issue of the nature of association, in particular in urban areas, will continue to dominate thinking about future initiatives. This document closes one story and opens another chapter that is still in the making. What certainly remains is that PROPAZ exists as a unique community model, directed by demobilised soldiers,

for the resolution and transformation of conflicts, pacification of communities, and the development of participatory democracy at local level.

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